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THE ANTITRUST STATE APPROVED
TRANSACTION EXEMPTION
ROBERT H. DUESENBERG*
INTRODUCTION
For centuries the common law has recognized that certain callings
and certain industries are affected with a public interest. Consequently, in
a wide variety of economic activity, there is government involvement and
control through statutory schemes administered by federal and state
agencies and private bodies.' Following the depression in 1929, recovery
efforts gave birth to many production and price-fixing laws as federal
and state governments attempted to rationalize competition.' Govern-
ments-not just the federal government-fix, control or affect prices,
license entry into industry and markets and otherwise regulate and
control the production and sale of goods and services rendered.
The restraint of competitive practices is inherent in all such regula-
tory activity. There is a need in such regulatory schemes for industry-
government cooperation which, if perpetrated solely in a private sector,
would violate fundamental antitrust law. Statutes regulating commerce
in most instances, however, do not expressly repeal antitrust laws
* Member of the Missouri Bar.
1. It is well established that regulated industries are not per se exempt from the
antitrust laws. Georgia v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945); United
States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ; Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of America,
Inc., 260 F. Supp 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966). A number of federal regulatory statutes, how-
ever, expressly provide immunity from the antitrust laws for certain approved conduct.
Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. II, 1967) ; Webb-Pomerene Act, 15
U.S.C. § 62 (1964) ; Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964); Federal Communi-
cations Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c) (1) (1964) ; Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. §§ 5(11), 5(b), 22 (1964) ; Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1964).
2. Federal and state marketing orders for agricultural products, particularly milk,
which remains the subject of strict economic control in many states, are examples of
government intrusion into business specifically to control production and price. See Ag-
ricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1964). For an example of a state
milk control law see VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-420 (1966). The federal constitutionality of
such laws is well established. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933). The state
constitutionality of the Virginia law was affirmed in Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v.
Agnew, 16 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1936), alf d, 300 U.S. 608 (1937). The myriad of
fair trade laws sanctioning price-fixing practices are likewise representative of govern-
ment involvement in business. See 1 TRADE REG. REP'. 11 6000-6374 (1965).
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forbidding monopolization and restraint of trade.' In a limited number
of statutes, Congress has ordained certain conduct with immunity from
the antitrust laws,4 but state legislatures are powerless to create similar
immunities. State legislation or state government action that conflicts
with the federal antitrust laws is invalid under the supremacy clause of
the Federal Constitution.'
As a result of the juxtaposition of antitrust laws and state regulatory
statutes, including their administrative provisions, there has developed a
source of anitrust exemption generally referred to as the "state approved
transaction" or "state action" exemption." Few cases have involved the
3. The Supreme Court has never held that a federal regulatory act has, by impli-
cation, completely displaced the antitrust laws. On the other hand, no serious challenge
has ever been made that the acts of the federal government are a violation of the anti-
trust laws. In United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative Assn, 307 U.S. 533 (1939), a
case in which the validity of federal milk orders was at issue, the Court said: "[T]he
fact that their [the Federal milk orders] effect would be to give cooperatives a monopoly
of the market would not violate the Sherman Act." Id. at 560.
This is not to say that federal regulation creates an antitrust exemption per se. Pri-
vate action which is within the scope of the commerce clause of the United States Con-
sitution is subject to the antitrust laws and is not exempted by a federal regulatory
scheme unless the Sherman Act has been limited by Congress in the regulatory statute
or an exemption by implication is inherent in the repugnancy of the regulatory statute
to the antitrust laws. The reluctance of the courts to imply antitrust immunity is en-
grained in the national economic policy reflected in the antitrust laws.
We have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental national
economic policy and have therefore concluded that we cannot lightly assume
that the enactment of a special regulatory scheme for particular aspects of an
industry was intended to render the more general provisions of the antitrust
laws wholly inapplicable to that industry. We have, therefore, declined to
construe industry regulation as an implied repeal of the antitrust laws even when
the regulatory statute did not contain an accommodation provision such as the
exemption provisions of the Shipping and Agricultural Acts.
Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966).
Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are
strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
The canon of statutory interpretation which Mr. Justice Story stated in Wood v.
United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 362-63 (1842), was first propounded in an anti-
trust context in United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) where the court stated:
It is not sufficient . . . "to establish that subsequent laws cover some or even
all of the cases provided for by the prior act; for they may be merely affirmative,
or cumulative, or auxiliary." There must be "a positive repugnancy between the
provisions of the new law, and those of the old; and even then the old law is
repealed by implication only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy."
Id. at 198-99.
4. See note 1 supra.
5. U.S. CoNrsT. art. 6. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1903).
6. There are numerous exemptions from the antitrust laws. Some are provided by
specific legislation. See note 1 supra. Only certain agreements may be affected, the
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1964), although broad areas of activities might be
involved. Other areas of exemption have arisen from judicial interpretation; the "state
action immunity" is such a creature. For a categorization of antitrust exemptions see
240
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issue, and no single case has set forth the essentials of the doctrine. Certain
characteristics of the principle,7 however, can be gleaned from the
decisions. This article will review the significant cases involving the
exemption and consider the question of whether the declared uncon-
stitutionality of a state regulatory statute should result in the with-
drawal of immunity for activity during the life of the statute.
Parker v. Brown
While the Supreme Court immediately recognized that the Sherman
Act should not apply to restraints imposed by government decree,' the
state action exemption was not fully formulated until 1943 in Parker v.
Brown,' wherein the exemption was first applied and its rational ex-
plication is best given.
In Parker, a program adopted by the state agricultural prorate
advisory commission under the California Agricultural Prorate Act was
attacked as being in conflict with the federal antitrust laws. The Prorate
Act authorized the establishment of programs for the marketing of
agricultural commodities produced in California so as to restrict com-
petiton among the growers and maintain prices in the distribution of the
commodities.
Subsequently, a program was adopted to control the production and
sale of raisins. Minimum prices were prescribed and producers were
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Committee on Antitrust Exemp-
tions, Antitrust Exemptions, 33 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 99 (1966).
7. The cases all involve actions under the Sherman Act. The Robinson-Patman
Act has not been reviewed in litigation in such a context. Though a specific inclusion is
not contained in the Act, sales transactions between private firms and the federal govern-
ment are generally not regarded as subject to the Robinson-Patman Act. Perhaps this
explains the absence of litigation involving that statute.
Shortly after the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, it was amended to provide
that nothing therein "shall apply to purchases of their supplies for their own use by
schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable insti-
tutions not operated for profit." 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964). The purpose of this legis-
lation was "to make certain that favors in price which are occasionally extended to elee-
mosynary institutions, because of the character of the institution, do not fall under the
ban of the Act." H.R. REP. No. 2161, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938). This objective and
the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be construed to restrict the
prerogatives and privileges of a sovereign unless expressly provided, is the basis of the
implicit exclusion of sales transactions to the government from the application of the
Act. 38 Op. Arr'v GEN. 539 (1936).
On the other hand, in the realm of contracts solely between private parties meeting
the jurisdictional requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act, a "state action immunity"
case is certainly conceivable. But see note 16 infra.
8. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), Justice
Holmes, commenting on the action of a foreign sovereign, stated: "[I]t is a contradic-
tion in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a foreign
sovereign power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable."
Id. at 358.
9. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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directed to sell at not less than such prices. The plaintiff, a producer and
packer of raisins, brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the program
by the Director of Agriculture and members of the state prorate com-
mission, alleging that the program was invalid because it conflicted with
the federal antitrust laws. The District Court for the Southern District
of California agreed and enjoined the operation of the program. But the
Supreme Court reversed upon the following reasoning:
We may assume for present purposes that the California Prorate
Program would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized
and made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or
conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate....
But it is plain that the prorate program here was never
intended to operate by force of individual agreement or com-
bination. It derived its authority and its efficacy from the
legislative command of the state and was not intended to
operate or become effective without that command. We find
nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a
dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify
a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such,
and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action
or official action directed by a state. ...
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action
in the Act's legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which
was ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it
prevented only "business combinations. ...
... Here the state command to the Commission and to, the
program committee of the California Prorate Act is not rendered
unlawful by the Sherman Act since, in view of the latter's words
and history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual
and not state action. It is the state which has created the
machinery for establishing the prorate program. Although the
organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, and a
prorate program, approved by the Commission, must also be
242
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approved by referendum of producers," it is the state acting
through the Commission, which adopts the program and which
enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a govern-
mental policy.'
The Court construed the Sherman Act as intending to suppress
combinations to restrain competition and individual and corporate at-
tempts to monopolize but not to restrain a state or its officers from
action directed by its legislature. In so doing, however, the Court did
not immunize a large area of private action within the meaning of the
commerce clause from the antitrust laws simply because the industry
or parties involved were subject to state regulation. Consonant with
the well-settled rule that regulated industries are not per se exempt
from the federal antitrust law,1" the Parker decision itself recognizes
that "[a] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful ... 1
In judging the applicability of the Parker rule to other situations,
it is essential to inquire whether the action in question is direct or in-
direct state action and, if indirect, whether it is action taken at the
express and affirmative direction of the state so as to make the conduct
"state action." Only the conduct of state government is beyond the
reach of the antitrust laws. Since the conduct of private business has the
mere sanction of the sovereign, it is not immunized under the rule. A
number of cases are particularly significant in delineating the elements
of the state action theory.
Comprehensiveness of Regulatory Scheme
In every decision considering the state action immunity doctrine it
is apparent that an important feature is the presence of a pervasive
regulatory statute. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier4 convincingly in-
10. The procedure for establishing a California prorate program was as follows:
A petition signed by at least ten producers in the area requesting a program was filed
with the Commission. The Prorate Commission, a state appointed agency, could grant
the petition upon making certain findings, and thereafter select a Program Committee
from nominees chosen by the producers in the area. The Prorate Commission could
select two additional members to represent the distributors. The Program Committee,
composed primarily of producers, would propose a specific marketing program for the
commodity, subject to the approval of both the Prorate Commission and sixty-five per-
cent of the affected producers owning at least fifty-one percent of the acreage devoted
to the creation of the regulation.
11. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
12. See note 3 supra.
13. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
14. 242 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.C. 1965), afj'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 930 (1966).
243
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dicates the importance of a comprehensive state regulation.
In Allstate, the authorized anticompetitive activity complained of
involved the fixing of insurance rates by a state bureau, the North
Carolina Automobile Rate Administration Office. Through this office
North Carolina maintained a system of automobile insurance regulations
under which uniform rates and standards were promulgated. As in
Parker, the initiative for rates and standards came from a rating bureau
composed of insurance companies. Their proposals were ultimately
approved, modified or disapproved by the Commissioner of Insurance.
All companies selling insurance were compelled to adhere to the establish-
ed rates and standards as a condition of doing business in the state.
Individual companies were thereby effectively precluded from competing
through offering lower premium rates. Allstate, wanting to offer in-
surance in North Carolina at less than state approved rates, brought
suit for a declaratory judgment seeking invalidation of the North
Carolina program on the ground that it permitted the unsupervised
establishment of minimum premiums by private companies." The Justice
Department filed an amicus memorandum supporting this position.'
15. Compare Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1959) with Winn Ave. Warehouse v. Winchester Tobacco Warehouse, 341 F.2d 287
(6th Cir. 1965) ; Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1965)
and American Fed'n of Growers v. Neal, 185 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950). The boards of
trade, though created by statute, were usually composed of the local warehousemen and
received little government supervision. Antitrust coverage was generally assumed and
disputed practices were decided mainly on the issue of reasonableness. In Asheville, the
board was, typically, established "to make reasonable rules and regulations for the eco-
nomical and efficient handling of the sale of leaf tobacco at auction on the warehouse
floors . . . in North Carolina . . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-465 (1966). The statute
specifically stated that it did not authorize the organization of any association having for
its purpose the control of prices or the making of rules and regulations in restraint of
trade.
16. The Allstate case is significant because the Department of Justice filed an
amicus memorandum in the district court. Following the district court's decision that
the establishment of rates was a governmental function, the United States did not join in
the appeal. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F. 2d 870, 872 n.2 (4th Cir. 1966).
In light of the cases applying the state action theory, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has announced that it does not regard the antitrust laws as extending to the sale of
milk by a distributor if the sale is made in compliance with state milk orders. Advisory
Op. No. 154, 3 TRADE R-o. REP. ff 18,138 (1967). In that opinion, the distributor did not
have a warehouse in the state in question, but shipped dairy products into the state from
warehouses located in neighboring states. In most cases, significant price increases
were required by the order issued pursuant to the state's dairy products marketing act.
Except where higher prices were required by law, the distributor sold the products at sub-
stantially lower prices to stores located in the neighboring states because of competitive
pressures.
The distributor expressed concern that, by agreeing to comply with the orders of the
state, he would subject himself to possible liability under the Sherman Act, the Federal
Trade Commission Act or the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
since the sales of commodities of like grade and quality were made at different prices to
purchasers in different states. Hence, an advisory opinion was requested as to whether
the distributor would be in violation of the above federal antitrust legislation adminis-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 1
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The statute creating the North Carolina rating bureau established
substantial state control. Although the insurance carriers proposed rates,
the final authority to approve or disapprove rate changes was lodged in
the Commissioner of Insurance. Most importantly, the statute specifically
authorized price-fixing 7 since it required adherence to the rates pre-
scribed by the bureau. Under the circumstances, the district court found
that the North Carolina rating bureau was operated under the active
supervision of the statei" and Allstate did not challenge that finding on
appeal.1
9
In affirming the decision of the district court granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
said:
The central question in both cases [Parker and Allstate] is
whether a program of regulation established and actively super-
vised by a state is subject to the antitrust laws. Absent Con-
gressional action departing from the rule of Parker v. Brown,
the North Carolina statutory plan is clearly valid."0
tered by the Commission if he complied with the state laws fixing the minimum resale
prices of dairy products.
The Commission advised that it was of the opinion that the distributor would
not be subject to a charge of violating any of the laws it administers because of
its compliance with the lawful orders of the states as to the minimum resale
prices of dairy products. In the Commission's view, it is well settled that the
antitrust laws have application to the actions of individuals, partnerships and
corporations and not to the activities of a state. While a state may not authorize
individuals to perform acts which violate the antitrust laws nor declare that such
action is lawful, it may, in the exercise of its sovereign power, itself conduct
such regulation of business activities within its borders as its own legislature
shall properly deem necessary in the public interest. So long as the resulting
regulation is a state as opposed to individual activity, those subject to the regu-
lation would not be subject to a charge of violating the antitrust laws by reason
of their compliance with the state's order.
Id.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-246(1) (1965).
18. The North Carolina statute creating the rating bureau provided:
There is hereby created a bureau to be known as the North Carolina Automo-
bile Rate Administrative Office, which office shall be established in the Com-
pensation Rating and Inspection Bureau of North Carolina, created under §
97-102, and shall be a branch and under the management of general manager of
the Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau of North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-246 (1965) (emphasis added).
19. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1966).
20. Id. The district court reviewed the legislative history of the McCarran Act
which provides for the retention of controls of the antitrust statutes in all areas of the
insurance business "to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law." Mc-
Carran Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964). While under consideration, section 2(b) was
strongly opposed by Senator Pepper who advocated greater subjection of the insurance
business to the antitrust laws. The court stated that section 2(b) was a legislative recog-
nition of the Parker doctrine:
There can be no doubt that the McCarran Act permits the State to regulate the
Duesenberg: The Antitrust State Approved Transaction Exemption
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In another insurance rate-fixing case, a proceeding similar to
Allstate, the North Little Rock Transportation Company sought to
enjoin the fixing of automobile liability insurance rates under the
Arkansas automobile risk plan."* Unlike the North Carolina rate bureau
statute" in the Allstate proceeding, the Arkansas statute" did not create
the rate-fixing bureau as an agency of the state, but rather the bureaus
were private organizations licensed by the state. As in North Carolina,
however, the bureaus were expressly provided the means whereby private
insurance companies could, with statutory sanction, engage in coopera-
tive action in rate-making.
As the Court assumed in Parker, the district court concluded that the
price-fixing activities of the bureau, in the absence of public regulations
or Congressional exemptions, would constitute a violation of the Sherman
Act.2' In declining to issue an injunction against the rate bureau's
activities, the court said, "[tihe Sherman Act is not violated by acts
authorized and regulated by state statute."25
The common thread in Parker, Allstate and North Little Rock
Transportation Co. is the comprehensive nature of the state regulatory
scheme and the ultimate state regulation of the accused transaction or
conduct. Even though a scheme is initiated among private businessmen
and results in anticompetitive restraints, its connection with a legitimate
state regulatory purpose creates an immunity.
Specific Direction of Immune Transaction
Of equal importance to the pervasive character of the regulatory
scheme is the requirement that the alleged anticompetitive activity be of
specific state direction. This was the situation in both Allstate and
North Little Rock Transportation. In Parker, the challenged activity was
specifically decreed by the prorate commission. It is not sufficient that
an industry is subject to state supervision, even though the supervision is
insurance business to the extent of regulating and handling, disposition of
policies, and prices paid for insurance and proceeds for claims. Parker v.
Brown indicates it would go that far in the field of insurance, and Congress went
at least as far as that decision with the McCarran Act.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 87 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
21. North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961
(E.D. Ark. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-246 to -248 (1965), particularly § 58-246(1).
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3101, 66-3115 to -3124 (1966).
24. North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961,
964 (E.D. Ark. 1949).
25. Id. Out of context this dictum is too broad; however, within the facts of
North Little Rock Transportation it is acceptable. The decision is similar to the rationale
of the immunity cases.
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general and broad. As indicated earlier,2 6 the existence of state regulation
does not assure antitrust immunity. 7
In Miley v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., 8 an insurance
broker licensed in Massachusetts brought a private treble damages
action under the Sherman Act against certain Massachusetts insurance
companies, certain officers of those companies and members of the State
Employees Group Insurance Commission. Plaintiff, along with other
insurance companies, had submitted a proposal to provide insurance
coverage for state employees in accordance with specifications established
by the Massachusetts State Employees Group Insurance Commission.
Subsequently, the Commission negotiated with and ultimately awarded
the contract to companies other than those represented by plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged that the insurance contract was awarded to the other
companies as the result of a conspiracy between the successful bidders and
the Commission. Noting the regulatory nature of the statute establishing
the State Employees Group Insurance Commission, a motion to dismiss
was granted. The Court stated:
[T]he fact that the transaction was regulated by Massachusetts
law removes it from the scope of the Sherman Act and any
violation of the state regulations is a matter solely of state law.29
The State as a Party to the Proceeding
In certain decisions subsequent to Parker, it would appear that a
state agency or officer must be named as a respondent for the state action
immunity doctrine to be applicable."0 Indeed, in Parker the prorate dis-
tricts were established through the actions of state officials 1 and operated
under the supervision of the state's Director of Agriculture. Parker, the
respondent, was the Director of Agriculture of California. Similarly, in
Miley the Massachusetts Insurance Commission and officials of the State
Employees Group Insurance Commission, a legislative creature, were
included as defendants. 2
No decision has directly considered the issue of whether the state
action exemption is available only in a proceeding against a state or state
26. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
27. Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal.
1966).
28. 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957).
29. 148 F. Supp. at 302. See also E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966).
30. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
31. Parker was instituted as an action against a state official. Brown v. Parker,
39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1942). Cf. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d
502 (4th Cir. 1959).
32. Miley v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957).
247
Duesenberg: The Antitrust State Approved Transaction Exemption
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1070
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
agency. In cases instituted against tobacco boards of trade which were
staffed by local growers and authorized to regulate marketing, the state
action principle was not applied, partially on the grounds that the boards
were not agencies of the state. The Fourth Circuit, for example, in
Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade v. FTC,3 quoting from the related
FTC opinion, stated:
[T]he officers and directors of the Asheville Board, and of
other boards, are neither elected by the people nor appointed
by State authority; they are businessmen who own and operate
warehouses on the tobacco market."4
Defending an attack on certain of its marketing rules, the Board
argued that it was in effect a "state agency" and, therefore, under Parker,
not subject to the antitrust laws. The Court rejected this contention
even though the Board existed under a North Carolina statute authorizing
tobacco warehousemen and buyers to organize boards of trade.8"
Notwithstanding the denial to apply the state action immunity rule
in Asheville Tobacco and similar cases and the implication of the quoted
dictum, it appears that immunity should not be denied simply because the
defendants are private parties to the antitrust action. Though Parker
was an antitrust action against a state official, it seems clear from the
decision that its principle is to have more than a fortuitous application.
"The Sherman Act makes no mention of the State as such, and gives no
hint that it was intended to restrain State action or official action
directed by a State." 6
An analysis of the tobacco board cases places the decisions in a class
which denies immunity because there is neither a specific legislative
mandate reflected in the action attacked nor a comprehensive legislative
system of regulation. The Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade was
organized primarily for the benefit of those engaged in the business. The
articles of association and by-laws constituted a contract among the
members by which each member consented to reasonable regulations
pertaining to the conduct of the business. The officers and members of
the Board were not elected, appointed or paid by the state.87
33. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
34. Id. at 510.
35. Cf. Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957)
American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950). See note
15 supra.
36. 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
37. 263 F.2d at 509. The Asheville decision is distinguishable from the true state
action case. The Court noted that the board of trade was not a creation of the state
and although the sale of tobacco at auction was of great importance to the state, the
actions of the board were really the operation of a business in the hands of private parties.
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Significantly, the challenged conduct in the tobacco board cases was
not activity responsive to state mandate. As the Sixth Circuit noted in
distinguishing a Kentucky tobacco board case:
[W]e are not concerned with a statute passed by the Kentucky
Legislature, but rather with a regulation adopted by the de-
fendant (Board of Trade) in pursuance of the Statute (autho-
rizing the organization of boards of trade). The argument,
therefore, that the Sherman Act does not restrain State action,
as decided in Parker v. Brown, is not applicable to the facts of
this case. 8
Rather than restricting or obfuscating the state action immunity
principle, these decisions underscore its salient feature-where alleged
anticompetitive conduct is pursuant to a specific power granted to a state
agency or mandate to a private body as an integral part of a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme, the antitrust immunity will obtain. The teaching
of Parker has effected the reconciliation between two areas of law that
otherwise might be mutually repugnant, namely the federal antitrust laws
and federally acceptable state regulatory processes"9 executed as part of a
state's general police powers to protect the public interest. Other decisions
support this view.4"
Anticompetitive Activity Subject to State Direction
While it does not appear necessary that a state official be a respon-
dent for the principle of Parker to apply, it is essential that that the
The state bore no expense for operations of the board. The officers and directors of the
board were not elected by the people nor appointed by the state; neither were they ac-
countable to the state in any significant sense nor supervised by state officials. The
action by the state was confined to assuring that the statutory requirements were satisfied-
the regulations adopted by the board had to be just, reasonable and not in restraint of
trade.
38. Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1964).
As in most of the tobacco cases, the applicability of the antitrust laws was virtually as-
sumed in Glasgow.
39. E.g., state regulation of the milk industry. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934).
40. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 284 F.
Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Miley v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 148 F. Supp.
299 (D. Mass. 1957); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 85
F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1949); Ins. Co. of North America v. Ins. Comm'n,
237 Miss. 759, 116 So. 2d 224 (1959). Cf. Olsen v. Smith, 68 S.W. 320 (Tex. 1902),
aff'd, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). In the Woods case, the complaint involved allegations that
the defendants, by submitting false information to the Texas Railroad Commission, had
procured an order from the Commission which unfairly discriminated against the plain-
tiff as to production and allocation quotas. That the restraint would have been illegal
under the antitrust laws if it had been arranged by the gas producers themselves was
unquestioned. But because it was ultimately the consequence of the Railroad Commis-
sion's functions, the plaintiff's action was denied on the authority of Parker. See also
Eastern Ry. Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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activity be within the ambit of a comprehensive regulatory scheme to be
immune from antitrust attack. In addition, the specific activity, conduct
or transaction should be subject to state regulation and responsive to the
powers of an officer or agency of the state.
In Marnell v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 1 the com-
plainants alleged that the defendants had unlawfully monopolized the
business of delivering retail packages from department and specialty
stores in the San Francisco Bay area. The defendants urged that the
activities 2 complained of were, in effect, activities of the State of
California because their business operations were subject to regulation by
the California Public Utilities Commission. The California Public Utilities
Code required the defendants and other intrastate common carriers to file
rate schedules with the Commission for approval, to file contracts and
instruments of other arrangements between carriers with the Commission,
to obtain operating certificates of convenience and necessity and to
furnish service in adequate fashion and at reasonable rates.
In denying defendant's motion to dismiss and rejecting the argu-
ment that the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission resulted in the
activities being activities of the state, the district court said:
It is apparent that the regulatory scheme of the California
Public Utilities Code is quite different from the regulatory
scheme of the Prorate Act considered in Parker v. Brown ....
Although California's scheme of regulation for motor
carriers emanates from the State as sovereign to carry out the
declared purposes of the Public Utilities Code, the regulatory
scheme is one of general supervision rather than one of specific
direction.
Although the California Public Utilities Code requires
and directs that motor carriers shall not operate without com-
pliance with certain of its provisions (e.g., requiring an oper-
ating permit or certificate) and although it further provides
and directs that motor carriers must affirmatively do other
things (e.g., file rate schedules in the case of common opera-
tions and refrain from charging minimum rates fixed by the
Commission), the Act does not otherwise affirmatively direct
41. 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
42. Specifically, the activities complained of included the purchasing of competitors
and potential competitors, obtaining covenants not to compete in defendant's territory
and not to oppose defendant's applications before various regulatory bodies, securing ex-
clusive service controls from customers as a condition for doing business, thwarting at-
tempted competition by clandestine investigation of potential competitors and reporting
on their abilities to customers and conspiring with labor unions, all in pursuit of a
monopoly in the market. -
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what the carrier's rates of contracts shall be--except that they
shall be reasonable.
Just as under the Interstate Commerce Act, the motor
carrier initially fixes and files his own rates (except re common
carrier rate increases which must be justified and approved by
the Commission) and forms and files its own contracts subject,
of course, to the supervisory power of the State Public Utilities
Commission.
The mere fact that California entrusts to the Public Utilities
Commission plenary reserve power to change these rates or
these contracts if it deems necessary in the public interest does
not mean that the rates and contracts under which defendants
have until now operated, although lawful, authorized and pre-
sumably reasonable, have been directed by the State of Cali-
fornia in the sense considered in Parker v. Brown ... "
Thus, even though a state plan of regulation may be one of general
supervision, that alone is not enough to establish immunity. The accused
conduct under the scheme must be state directed or prescribed and of a
character for which a state official or agency is responsive. In effect,
the activity must be on behalf of the state.4" The district court could not
make this determination from the conduct challenged in Marnell. After a
thorough review of the Interstate Commerce Act and the California
Public Utilities Code, which were found parallel in many aspects, the
court could not agree that the conduct in question was directed by the
state pursuant to the Utilities Code.
In the cases where immunity has been granted, the regulatory
schemes were effectuated through agencies of the state or in a manner
responsive to a state official or department. The presence of a responsive
elected or appointed state officer, the existence of a legislatively established
system of operation for the promulgation of the state activity, regulation
financed through state funds and the furtherance of a governmental
policy established by the legislature are indispensable characteristics to
the application of the doctrine.
43. Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of America, 260 F. Supp. 391, 409 (N.D. Cal.
1966) (emphasis added).
44. See Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Cooperative Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir.
1968). Action which is not required by a state statute, though engaged in by a regu-
lated industry in restraint of trade, violates the Sherman Act where the commerce ele-
ment is present. See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F. Supp.
1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969), where the application of the state immunity doctrine was denied
since the anticompetitive means were not shown to be authorized by the state nor in-
tended to achieve any specific governmental purpose.
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Motive for Anticompetitive Activity
The state action exemption is available even though the action is
intended to eliminate competition or produce an adverse effect on a
certain party or segment of the economy. It appears that such activity
is shielded from the Sherman Act regardless of the intent and purpose.45
If the Sherman Act does not reach anticompetitive state action, there
can be no legal injury under the antitrust laws for which recovery is
allowable. In this respect, the state action immunity cases have employed
the rationale of Eastern Ry. President's Conference v. Noerr Motors
Freight, Inc." and United Mine Workers v. Pennington" which exempt-
ed joint efforts to influence public officials from antitrust sanctions.
There have been two cases which clearly illustrate the application of this
rationale. 8
In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America," the complaint alleged that the defendants, by submitting false
information to the Texas Railroad Commission, had procured an order
from the Commission which discriminated against plaintiff in assigning
production and allocation quotas. The restraint involved unquestionably
would have been illegal under the antitrust laws had it been arranged by
the gas producers themselves. But, as the ultimate responsibility was that
of the Commission, the restraint was held to be the result of valid
government action for which there was no recoverable element of damages
under the antitrust laws, notwithstanding the harmful intentions in
submitting false affidavits.
The Woods decision rested heavily on the Noerr-Pennington°
doctrine. It also relied on Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v.
Florida Power & Light Co.,5 which also involved prevarications and
abusively damaging conduct. In this case, the plaintiff alleged an unlaw-
ful combination and conspiracy to monopolize exclusive control in supply-
ing power. The record clearly indicated the existence of a conspiracy in
which the defendants had willfully presented false arguments to the State
Road Department which had the power to deny service applications. In
45. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 284 F. Supp.
582 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
46. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
47. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
48. Okefenokee Rural Elect. Membership Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 214
F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 284 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
49. 284 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968). Cf. Woods Exploration & Producing Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 36 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 382 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1964).
50. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
51. 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954).
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addition, the defendants admittedly conducted a smear campaign to keep
plaintiffs out of the county. The district court, in dismissing the com-
plaint for want of a legal injury, held that there was no liability under the
Sherman Act where the injury resulted from official action of a state
agency, whether or not the acts were inspired by individuals.5"
EFFECT OF REPEAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE REGULATORY LAWS
The essence of the state action exemption is that the Sherman Act
does not extend to restraints which result from the exercise of a legitimate
governmental function. What if those functions were exercised under a
statute creating a regulatory system which is later declared unconstitu-
tional? Is an antitrust action available for redress of an injury that is not
barred by limitations?
When a statute is repealed or expires, the general effect of its
termination is prospective and matters and transactions closed pursuant
to the law while extant are judged thereunder.53 It is a black letter
rubric in many cases, however, that an unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though
it had never been passed.5" Perforce of this rule, conduct has been
judged outside the purview of an invalid statute.
More recently the Supreme Court, in dealing with the effect of an
unconstitutional act, has said:
It is quite clear . . . that such broad statements as to the effect of
a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with quali-
fications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the sub-
sequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects,-with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
52. See also E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362
F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), involving refusal by the Port Authority to renew a concession li-
cense; Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956), a case against the state
board of medical examiners for refusing to grant a license to practice medicine.
53. See 16 AM. JUR. CONST. LAW § 423 (1964).
54. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
It has again and again been held that an unconstitutional statute is simply a
statute in form, is not a law, and under every circumstance or condition lacks the
force of law, and, further, that it is of no more saving effect to justify action
taken under it than as though it had never been enacted.
Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N.W. 454, 457 (1903).
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Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status,
of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature of both
of the statute and of its previous applications, demand examina-
tion. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attentions of courts, state and federal,
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified. 5
Justice Hughes' dictum has since been favorably reflected upon in
another Supreme Court decision in which Justice Jackson opined:
"[E]ven where a statute is unconstitutional and hence declared void as
of the beginning, this Court has held that its existence before it has
been so declared is not to be ignored."5
55. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1939).
Even in the history of earlier cases, it appears that Justice Story's pronouncement in
the Norton decision was not universal. See Dexter v. Alfred, 64 Hun 636, 19 N.Y.S.
770 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
The defendant, in his answer in this case, undertakes to justify or mitigate the
alleged trespass committed by him after the passage of the act, and before the
same was declared unconstitutional by the courts, on the ground that the com-
missioner of highways was acting under and in pursuance of the provisions of
this act, while it was in force, and before it was adjudged to be unconstitutional,
and that the defendant was acting under the orders of the commissioner. It was
no part of the duty of the commissioner of highways to decide whether the law
in question was or was not constitutional. His duty was to execute the law as
he found it. "Under our system of government, no power is given to public of-
ficers to refuse or suspend their obedience to laws on any opinion of their own
that a law is unconstitutional."
. . . [W]e think in this case that it was competent for the defendant to
set up, as a defense or partial defense to this action, the acts of the commissioner
under this statute, and that the acts done by the defendants were under the direc-
tion or orders of the commissioner and that the judgment and order on the
demurrer should be affirmed.
Id. at 771.
56. NLRB v. Rockaway News, 354 U.S. 71, 77 (1953). The question of retroactive
application of a judicial ruling was reviewed in depth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
At common law there was no authority for the proposition that judicial de-
cisions made law only for the future. Blackstone stated the rule that the duty of
the court was not to "pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the
old one." . . . This Court followed that rule in Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425 (1886), holding that unconstitutional action "confers no rights; it im-
poses no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." The judge
rather than being the creator of the law was but its discoverer. . . . In the case
of the overruled decision [or statute] . . . it was thought to be only a failure
at true discovery and was consequently never the law; while the overruling
one, Mapp, was not "new law but an application of what is, and theretofore had
been, the true law." . . .
On the other hand, Austin maintained that judges do in fact do something
more than discover law; they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial
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Retrospective Application of Changes in Antitrust Law
The Supreme Court and many lower courts have repeatedly em-
phasized that the private remedy of the antitrust laws was established by
the Congress as a matter of public policy." Through the award of treble
interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms
that alone are but the empty crevices of the law. Implicit in such an approach
is the admission when a case is overruled that the earlier decision was wrongly
decided. However, rather than being erased by the later overruling decision, it is
considered as an existing juridical fact until overruled, and intermediate cases
finally decided under it are not to be disturbed.
The Blackstonian view ruled English jurisprudence and cast its shadow
over our own as evidenced by Norton v. Shelby County, supra. However, some
legal philosophers continued to insist that such a rule was out of tune with ac-
tuality largely because judicial repeal ofttime did "work hardship to those who
(had) trusted to its existence." . . . The Austinian view gained some accep-
tance over a hundred years ago when it was decided that although legislative
divorces were illegal and void, those previously granted were immunized by a
prospective application of the rule of the case. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio
445 (1848). And as early as 1863 this Court drew on the same concept in
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1863) . . . . In Gelpcke, which arose after
the overruling decision, this Court held that the bonds issued under the ap-
parent authority granted by the legislature were collectible. "However, we may
regard the late (overruling) case in Iowa as affecting the future, it can have
no effect upon the past." The theory was, as Mr. Justice Holmes states in
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371 (1910), "that a change of judicial
decision after a contract has been made on the faith of an earlier one the other
way is a change of the law." And in 1932 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Great North-
ern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, applied the Austinian
approach in denying a federal constitutional due process attack on the prospec-
tive application of a decision of the Montana Supreme Court. He said that a
State "may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation
and that of relation backward." Mr. Justice Cardozo based the rule on the
avoidance of "injustice of hardship" citing a long list of state and federal cases
supporting the principle that the courts had the power to say that decisions
though later overruled "are law none the less for intermediate transactions."
At 364. Eight years later Chief Justice Hughes in Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), in discussing the problem made
it clear that the broad statements of Norton, supra, "must be taken with quali-
fications." He reasoned that the actual existence of the law prior to the de-
termination of unconstitutionality "is an operative fact and may have conse-
quences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration." He laid down the rule that the "effect of the sub-
sequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects."
Id. at 622-25 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). Endorsing the approach in Chicot,
the Court said:
Thus the accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in the
interest of justice make the rule prospective. And "there is much to be said in
favor of such a rule for cases arising in the future."
While the cases discussed above deal with the invalidity of statutes or the
effect of a decision overturning long-established common-law rules, there seems
to be no impediment-constitutional or philosophical-to the use of the same rule
in the constitutional area where the exigencies of the situation require such an
application.
Id. at 628.
57. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) ; United
States v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
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damages the private sector is induced to assist in the enforcement of these
laws. Measured as a law directed at the economic regulation of private
business, the private remedy has had a significant role in antitrust
enforcement. Discouraging that role should be permitted only with great
caution. Nevertheless, the consideration of the retroactive applications of
decisional changes in antitrust laws has been before the courts several
times in private treble damage cases. Fairness and equity have been
adjudged properly served by denying the retrospective effect of a change
in law.
The most recent antitrust case presenting the issue is Simpson v.
Union Oil Co.5" where the issue was raised as the result of a 1964
Supreme Court decision holding that a consignment device could not
give shelter to the consignor responsible for retail price-fixing practices
from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. 9 The appellants had urged
that limiting the Supreme Court decision to a prospective application
would run afoul of the Constitution's due process requirement. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the appellant's contention and held that the district
court had ruled correctly in deciding that
[t]he equities warrant only prospective application to dam-
age suits of the rule respecting price fixing by the consign-
ment device announced in Simpson v. Union Oil Company of
California, and particularly do not warrant application of the
rule to this case."0
While this decision has since been reversed by the Court so as not to
deny the plaintiff the fruits of his litigation, the principle of prospective
application of a change in juridical law has not been abnegated.6'
Prior to the remand of Simpson, another district court resolved the
nearly identical question in a similar manner. 2 The issue again evolved
from the 1964 decision in Simpson.
[T]he circumstances seem to me to compel the conclusion
that the doctrine of Union Oil should not retroactively govern
58. 270 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1967), affd, 411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rev'd,-
U.S.-, 90 S. Ct. 30 (1969). At the earlier stage of the litigation, where the con-
signment method was found illegal as a price-fixing device, the Court concluded:
We reserve the question whether, when all facts are known, there may be any
equities that would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the
rule governing price fixing by the "consignment" device which we announce
today.
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24-25 (1964).
59. Id.
60. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 270 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
61. See note 58 supra.
62. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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this case. If we are to look at the purpose of the Union Oil
doctrine, that purpose would appear to be to prohibit price
fixing by means of an agency or consignment contract, to the
end that competition shall be free from this restraint. It could
be said that it does not necessarily further the accomplishment
of this purpose to impose a liability for treble damages upon
one who made such a contract many years ago. The price fixing
in such a case is of historical importance only. Its effect on
competition is long since past. Competition in electric lamps in
1951 cannot be revived by awarding damages to these plaintiffs
in 1964.
Be that as it may, it is the element of reliance by de-
fendants upon the former rule that is to me most compelling.
To hold Westinghouse liable now for damages for making and
carrying out a contract which was perfectly legal at the time
that it was made and carried out would be manifestly unjust.
It is hard to conceive of a case in which there could be stronger
"equities" in defendants' favor."3
The Third Circuit, after finding that the Supreme Court had
overruled the prior interpretation of certain facets of the antitrust law,
did not give retrospective effect to the decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. 4
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court in criminal cases
have made it clear that the unrealistic theory that the law has
always been what the latest case for the first time declares it to
be, the so-called Blackstonian view, must yield to the practical
realization that conduct had occurred in reliance on the earlier
rules of law to the contrary. In antitrust cases the question of
retroactivity is still open. We believe that retroactivity should
be determined from the circumstances of the particular case,
having in mind the purpose which the new rule of law seeks to
accomplish and the practical weighing of the comparative bene-
fits and evils of retroactivity. In civil cases, unlike criminal
cases, it is appropriate to recognize that businessmen must rely
upon counsel, who in turn are guided by the existing precedents
in making difficult decisions on the effect of the antitrust laws
on specific business conduct. In suits for damages in such cases
it is particularly appropriate to be mindful of the injustice of
63. Id. at 537.
64. 377 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 481 (1968).
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retroactive imposition of the penalty of treble damages ...
United should not be held to have violated the antitrust laws
before the change occurred in the law which for the first time
made its conduct unlawful.6 5
The pervasiveness of governmental economic regulation in today's
society, regulation that often carries the force of civil and criminal
sanctions, requires an approach to the problem that is based on the
jurisprudence of Justice Hughes' dictum. Arguably, in all contexts the
question presented when a statute is declared invalid should not be as
concerned with whether the statute ever had the force of law, but should
inquire into the fairness of giving retrospective recognition to the ruling.
Overruled decisions are judicial facts, and practical consequences, such as
hardship or injustice, have been taken into account in deciding whether
changes in decisional law should be retroactive.6" There is no reason why
65. 377 F.2d at 789. On appeal, the Supreme Court finding that there was no
issue involving the overruling of prior judicial precedent did not reach the question of
retrospective application. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 393 U.S.
481, 496 (1968).
66. City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 385 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Prospective effect only has been given to many judicial decisions overruling extant law,
whether the rule is statutory or decisional. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940) ; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 268 (1928). For decisions over-
ruling prior case law see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (effect of
Miranda and Escobedo dealing with custodial policy questioning of suspects) ; Tehan v.
United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (effect of Griffin dealing with comment
on failure of defendant to take the stand) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)
(effect of Mapp dealing with illegally seized evidence) ; Benson v. Carter, 396 F.2d 319
(9th Cir. 1968); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959) (tort immunity of school) ; Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378
(1966) (jury composition in civil cases); Parker v. Post Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1,
105 N.W.2d 1 (1960) (effect of abolition of charitable immunity rule) ; Brown v. City
of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968) (abolition of governmental immunity
rule retroactive only if government entity insured and then only to extent of insurance) ;
Meyers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966) (abolition of charitable im-
munity rule retroactive only if charity insured and then only to extent of insurance);
Rabon v. Rowan Mem. Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967) (abolition of tort
immunity of hospitals) ; In re Western Pa. Nat'l Bank, 424 Pa. 161, 225 A.2d 676 (1967)
(changed rule of will construction inapplicable to will of decedent dying before Supreme
Court decision changing rule) ; Wojtanowski v. Franciscan Fathers' Minor Conventuals,
34 Wis. 2d 1, 148 N.W.2d 54 (1967) ; Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963) (abolition of parental immunity).
For cases involving the invalidity of statutes see Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 233 (1864) (effect of bonds issued under unconstitutional statute); J. A.
Doughtery's Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1941) (for purposes of
determining federal undistributed profits tax, taxpayer held entitled to accrue deduction
for state taxes for the taxable year imposed by a state statute subsequently held un-
constitutional) ; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 87 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Harrison, 18 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1937) (suit against tax collector
who collected taxes under unconstitutional statute) ; Austin v. Campbell, 91 Ariz. 195,
370 P.2d 769 (1962) (reimbursement of expenses paid state legislators under statute
later declared unconstitutional denied) ; McCormack v. Friel, 327 Ill. App. 208, 63
N.E.2d 784 (1945) ; Gordon v. Connor, 183 Okla. 82, 80 P.2d 322 (1938) (officer pro-
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a similar inquiry should not be made when determining whether an
antitrust exemption is available for anticompetitive conduct pursuant to
government mandate under a statute later found invalid.
In some postures the purpose of the antitrust laws-the prohibition
of price-fixing-may be furthered by imposing liability retrospectively
subsequent to a decisional change in the law. In the case of a retrospective
application involving the state action immunity principle where contracts
are made or conduct engaged in upon faith in the existing regulatory
scheme, a retrospective application would appear certain to be unduly
severe.
The Sherman Act is not a proscription of all societal ills; regulatory
statutes involving the state action theory are equally significant. Indeed,
as compared to the general language of the Sherman Act, most regulatory
laws are explicit as to the economic restraints they are designed to effect
and detailed as to implementation and enforcement. Where business
conduct is decreed by a political entity, should the segment of society
regulated thereunder be penalized for adherence to its directives if the
law which created the entity is repealed or declared invalid? The public
has a right to presume that a statute is an operative fact until legislatively
or judicially excised, and a member should not be visited with harsh
sanctions in meeting its duty to comply."7
CONCLUSION
When state processes are conceived to embrace more than simply
economic considerations, it is proper that the Sherman Act be interpreted
so as not to thwart those. ends. The functions of government foster many
purposes and are responsive to many interests. The imposition of
restraints which are not uniquely economic but addressed to other areas
and other problems of proper governmental concern should not result
in liability under the Sherman Act.
The regulation of activity to which the Sherman Act is properly
applied is of a nature which should be governed solely by market
mechanisms. If the government is involved as a customer in the market
place-an economic unit rather than a maker of policy in the political
process-there should be no exemption from the Sherman Act and
tected in paying salaries under unconstitutional statute) ; Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss.
241, 11 So. 2d 906 (1943) (official not liable for excluding students from public schools
under unconstitutional statute) ; Rust v. Newby, 171 Tenn. 127, 100 S.W.2d 989 (1937)
(plaintiff's claim barred where plaintiff conspired in bad faith to evade regulatory
statute subsequently declared unconstitutional) ; Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d
408, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967) (effect of unconstitutional statutory tax exemption used as
incentives to attract business).
67. Austin v. Campbell, 91 Ariz. 195, 370 P.2d 769 (1962).
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Parker affords none. But when there is no question about the legitimacy
of government concern, the action of private parties pursuant to its
proper directive should be free from antitrust exposure. There is a great
practical utility to the doctrine if liberally applied. It affords the private
businessman a modicum of predictability in resolving antitrust questions
which may arise in his dealings with state government officers and
agencies and enables legislative policy to be effectuated in a regulated
industry.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss2/1
